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abstract
Contrary to the popular assumption that linguistically mediated social practices constitute the 
normativity of action (Kiverstein and Rietveld, 2015; Rietveld, 2008a,b; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014), I 
argue that it is affective care for oneself and others that primarily constitutes this kind of normativity. I 
argue for my claim in two steps. First, using the method of cases I demonstrate that care accounts for the 
normativity of action, whereas social practices do not. Second, I show that a social practice account of 
the normativity of action has unwillingly authoritarian consequences in the sense that humans act only 
normatively if they follow social rules. I suggest that these authoritarian consequences are the result of 
an uncritical phenomenology of action and the fuzzy use of “normative”. Accounting for the normativity 
of action with care entails a realistic picture of the struggle between what one cares for and often 
repressive social rules.
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Proponents of embodied cognition, following prominent phenomenologists, have come to 
appreciate the role that bodily abilities, embodied mechanisms, language and affective care 
play for the constitution of diverse kinds of normativity. They have developed accounts of 
normativity for animal cognition (Barandarian et al., 2009; Thompson, 2007; Thompson and 
Stapleton, 2009), ethics (Colombetti and Torrance, 2009; Urban, 2015), rationality (Gallagher, 
2018) and everyday human action in general (Jeuk, 2017a, 2019; Kiverstein and Rietveld, 2015; 
Rietveld, 2008a,b; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014). And it is the last one, the normativity of 
human action, which I analyze in this paper.
I argue that care for oneself and others should be considered the main source of the 
normativity of everyday human actions, rather than linguistically mediated social practices. 
I establish my claim in contrast to Julian Kiverstein’s and in particular Erik Rietveld’s work. 
Their account, contrary to mine, emphasizes the importance of linguistically mediated social 
practices over care. I show that their account entails counterintuitive results if applied to 
several instances of everyday human action. I further show that the idea that social practices 
constitute the normativity of action has unwelcome ethical ramifications, if we switch our 
focus from idealized actions in the arts, in games and in professional sports to mundane 
instances of actions that are representative of the social reality of most humans.
Rietveld and Kiverstein have put particular emphasis on the co-constitutive role of care—
what they call “concern”—, bodily skill and language for the normativity of action (Kiverstein 
and Rietveld, 2015; Rietveld, 2008a,b; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014). They depart from the 
assumption that human and non-human animals can perform normative actions.
The normative standards at work in animal behaviour are not conferred on the 
animal from the outside. These are standards that originate in the animal’s practical 
understanding of the possibilities for action the material environment offers. Animals 
in exercising their abilities and skills are no less capable of refining and improving their 
grip on the environment, and in doing so they display sensitivity to whether their grip 
on the environment is better or worse. Some way of engaging with the environment 
can be better or worse relative to the activities in which animals belonging to a 
particular form of life take part. (Kiverstein and Rietveld, 2015, p. 719)
Animal actions exhibit normativity because they can be performed better or worse. Animals 
1. Introduction
2. Rietveld and 
Kiverstein on the 
Normativity of 
Everyday Actions
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can advance the skills that control their actions and they can recognize if they perform 
subpar. Rietveld and Kiverstein ascribe this potential for normative action, not unlike Dreyfus 
(2002), to what Merleau-Ponty has called the “grip on the environment”. Importantly, 
animals are motivated to enhance their grip on the environment because they care for the 
consequences of successful actions. 
Despite highlighting the centrality of care for the normativity of animal actions, Rietveld 
and Kiverstein state that the case varies in certain respects for humans, given their unique 
linguistic form of life.
The human form of life is one that is heavily mediated by linguistic forms of 
communication, and questions of getting things right arise for humans with an interest in 
communicating about a shared sociomaterial world. (Kiverstein and Rietveld 2015, p. 719)
What concretely explains the normativity of everyday human actions—what Rietveld (2008) 
calls “situated normativity”—is the ability to follow linguistically mediated social human 
practices: “that one is reliably participating in a communal custom” (Rietveld, 2008b, p. 
985). Rietveld ascribes this idea, like many other proponents of embodied cognition, to 
Wittgenstein, to whom I refer henceforth as “EC-Wittgenstein” (Embodied Cognition-
Wittgenstein, i.e. how Wittgenstein is regularly interpreted by proponents of embodied 
cognition).1 
Even though Rietveld argues that shared social practices are the primary source of normativity 
for human everyday actions, he still attributes a significant role to care. 
Situated and lived normativity presupposes embodied concerns. Once certain things 
matter to someone, one may be affectively inﬂuenced. These concerns operate at the 
level of the skillful body and immediately tie the individual to the normative order by 
producing appropriate affective behaviour. Note that experts typically care about the 
adequacy of the objects they produce. (Rietveld, 2008b, p. 993)
Rietveld argues for the existence of a complex feedback loop between care and linguistically 
mediated social practices. He argues, following Hobson (2004), that already children affectively 
care about the social feedback of others and therefore internalize socially shared practices. 
And in the process of adapting to, refining and performing normative actions, care plays a 
sustaining cause, in that care compels individuals to abide by social rules.2
Rietveld explains this process using the example of how an architect is skill-wise socialized 
in her community. An architect acquires skills and develops care for her craft through hard 
work and learning. She does so through the interaction with experts in her field, who are 
themselves standing in a social relationship to other experts in their field. The latter point 
is supposed to stress the wider social character of social practices, such as architecture. As 
1 My aim in this paper is not to evaluate whether the idea that following social practices constitutes the normativity 
of action, in the way it is described by proponents of embodied cognition, is actually Wittgenstein’s (Heras-
Escribano and de Pinedo, 2016; Hutto, 2013; Loughlin, 2014; Rietveld, 2008b). I confine myself therefore here to 
describe how Wittgenstein is interpreted by proponents of embodied cognition which is also why I use the phrase 
“EC-Wittgenstein”.
2 “Compelling” is a term that Rietveld constantly uses. To be charitable, he uses the term to explain the phenomenon 
of non-deliberative action that often has a compelling nature. Yet we will see that terms like “compelling” or 
“disciplining” can swiftly reveal the authoritarian undertones of social rule-following, depending on how we render 
the social context in which actions occur.
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Rietveld claims: 
Due to all this largely unobtrusive and unnoticed disciplining of the body the architect has 
learned to see what is right and what is not. She develops preferences and sensitivities along the 
lines of the examples set by these experts. This way she develops a ‘feeling’ for the situation 
and the ability to assess, and if necessary to correct her own performance. (Rietveld, 
2008b, p. 989, italics mine)
The idea here is that agents are re-directed towards social rules by means of careful discontent 
in case they unwillingly deviate from a social rule. Given these considerations, affective care 
moves from a prime source of the normativity of action, that it plays for non-human animals, 
to a mechanism of learning, refinement and disciplining that keeps humans in the constraints 
of socially shared practices. Further, note the strong normative (“what is right and what is 
not”) as well as authoritarian language that Rietveld uses in the quote above. The architect 
is disciplined into practices that she accepts as her preferences and sensitivities based on the 
examples given to her by experts. As we will see later, this, if read charitably, amounts to a naïve 
Panglossian view of social norms. If read in the context of most people’s social reality, it rather 
describes an authoritarian, if not totalitarian view of norms.
Despite these shortcomings, I think there is a lot to agree with Rietveld’s work. In particular, 
the idea that affective care is responsible for non-deliberative rule-keeping judgments is a 
most welcome addition to the debate. And it also seems true that affective care is responsible 
for the adaption, refinement and disciplining of human action with regard to social practices. 
In the following, I show, first, that the normativity of everyday human actions derives 
primarily from affective care for oneself and others, and not from linguistically mediated 
social rules. Then I show, second, that care for oneself and others does not stand in the naïve, 
harmonious relationship to social rules that authors who follow EC-Wittgenstein seem to 
assume. Even though many social practices certainly contribute to what makes us who we 
are—independent of whether that is good or bad—many, if not most social rules might stand in 
an adverse relationship to what we want and care for; i.e. they force us to follow practices that 
might not be in alignment with our care for us and others. Accordingly, some of us constantly 
have to compromise or negotiate between the normativity that derives from our care for 
ourselves and others and the law-like rules of socially constructed practices. 
One basic idea, that certainly goes back to at least Heidegger (1927/2006), but also to other 
philosophical traditions that emphasize the importance of interest, affect and care, such as 
utilitarianism (Singer, 2009), is that affective care plays a constitutive role for the grounding 
and generation of normativity and phenomena related to normativity, such as goals and 
purposes. Ratcliffe (2002), referring to Heidegger, puts it like this: “Care is the condition for the 
possibility of apprehending the world as a significant whole, as an arena of possible projects, 
goals and purposes” (p. 289). 
Similarly, Urban gives a succinct summary of the role of care, which he calls “concern”, for 
enactivism, one particular sub-paradigm within embodied cognition that has been heavily 
inﬂuenced by work of phenomenologists:
That which makes the world meaningful for a cognitive system is its concern governed 
by the norm of the system’s own continued existence and ﬂourishing. It means that 
sense-making establishes a non-neutral perspective on the world which comes with its 
own normativity. Certain interactions facilitate autonomy of the system, while others 
degrade it – the former are better, the latter are worse. (Urban, 2015, p. 122)
3. Care for Oneself 
and Others versus 
Authoritarian 
Rule-Following
48
ALExANDER ALBERT JEUk
The conception of care that I use in this paper to account for the normativity of action draws 
heavily on Heidegger’s (1927/2006) concept of “Sorge”, the primary English translation of 
which is “care” (Dreyfus, 1991; Heidegger, 1927/1962). Heidegger’s concept of care refers to a 
transcendental structure that itself comprises the transcendental structures understanding, 
affectivity, falling and discourse which Heidegger further grounds in the transcendental 
structure temporality (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 335). Taken together, these transcendental 
structures are the ontological conditions of the possibility of us being in our world: “Dasein’s 
Being is care” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 329).
Care accounts for action ontologically, because without care we cannot account for how 
the world presents itself as a place that invites actions, rather than a place of unintelligible 
substances or space-time points that have no significance for embodied creatures such as us 
(Dreyfus, 1991; Heidegger, 1927/1962; Jeuk, 2017a, 2019; Zahavi, 2009). And care accounts for 
action psychologically, because without caring, we would have no motivation to act in the first 
place (Heidegger, 1927/1962; Jeuk, 2019; Ratcliffe, 2002).
Obviously, an explanation, let alone a justification of this Heideggerian transcendental project 
is beyond the confines of this paper. Fortunately, it is also not necessary for my argument. I 
use in the following “care” in its everyday (alltäglich) sense—that sense from which Heidegger 
departs his analyses too. “Care”, according to this everyday sense means as much as affectively 
caring for something. Since “care”, in its ordinary language sense, contrary to its ontological 
sense, is not further analyzable, I explicate “care” in the following with the help of examples. 
Applying the method of cases, I develop examples of cases of representative human actions 
and account for the normativity of these actions either with care or with linguistically 
mediated social rule-following practices. This procedure shows that care accounts for the 
normativity of action more adequately than linguistically mediated social rule-following 
practices.
Before I commence with my analysis, I want to highlight one important point. Even though 
I stated above that I do not want to further engage with transcendental considerations and 
that I deem “care” not further analyzable in its everyday meaning, it is important to keep in 
mind that there is an affective and understanding-related component to care, as Heidegger 
(1927/1962) made clear: “Every understanding has its mood. Every state-of-mind is one in 
which one understands” (p. 385).3
In order to care for something, we have to understand what it is and why we care for it. Yet, 
the why of caring is certainly affective; caring is not a disinterested cognitive state. In that 
sense care has several connotations: affective ones, cognitive ones and ethical ones because 
usually caring involves, as we will see, caring for what seems right to us.
In that sense, care is the primary form of normativity for all animals in that they seek to 
act according to what is good for them and others that they care about if they can do the 
latter (Jeuk 2019). For instance, out of care for oneself, a bird looks for food, because it seeks 
to sustain itself. And I wake up in the morning and go to work as it is expected from me 
because, in the end, I care about getting paid and buying food for myself and my loved ones. 
Concretely, I do not wake up in the morning and go to work, do what is expected from me, 
because I uncritically follow rules like an automaton. I do so, because, if I am lucky enough, I 
care about my job. Or rather, like most humans that have to sell their labor (or even have to 
3 Particularly the translation of “Befindlichkeit” as “state-of-mind” is unfortunate, because it conceals the affectivity 
involved in Befindlichkeit (Heidegger, 1927/2006, p. 335), but “mood” expresses the involved affectivity well and is an 
adequate translation of “Stimmung”, which Heidegger uses in the original as an aspect of Befindlichkeit (Heidegger, 
1927/2006, p. 335).
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do slave labor), I do so because I care for things that can only be sustained in most societies if 
an employer or other market actor compensates me monetarily. Similarly, when I prepare a 
sandwich for myself, I might follow a social rule or rather a suggestion for a certain recipe. Yet, 
I only do so not because I am uncritically following a rule, but because I believe that following 
this recipe will allow me to make a sandwich that is to my liking—probably because I believe 
that the author of the recipe possesses a certain skill at cooking that is indicative of a cooking 
mastery that allows preparing dishes that are tastier than the meals that I could have prepared 
based on my own limited skill set. Yet, contrary to that Rietveld (2008b) claims: “Note that 
the expert’s adequate response does not only decrease her dissatisfaction, but also changes 
something in the intersubjective world: it corrects the object” (p. 969, my italics). 
How does this apply to the sandwich example? What is correct about a certain sandwich? 
If a sandwich is to my liking and an expert cook would alter the taste so that I do not like it 
anymore, in which way would she correct my sandwich? What Rietveld might have in mind 
here, following EC-Wittgenstein, might be this: my sandwich might not fall into any socially 
recognizable linguistic category, such as, for example, “BLT Sandwich”. And the expert cook 
might “correct” my sandwich so that it does fall into a socially recognizable category. Yet, the 
question is why that should be important, as long as I do not specifically care for making a 
sandwich according to a social category. And even if I would care that my sandwich falls into a 
socially recognizable category according to a rule, it seems as if my care for this, as suggested 
above, derives from my care for something like taste and not for my care that my sandwich 
falls into a socially recognizable category. We certainly cannot claim that the act of making a 
sandwich that does not fall into a social category is not a normative action. As long as I care 
about the outcome of my action, the action is also normative; the sandwich is correct for me. 
There are obviously many cases where the normativity of action partly depends on linguistic 
social rule-following; for instance, many actions that involve language are such cases. For 
example, if I go to a diner and order a Kale Sandwich and get a Reuben Sandwich instead, 
a social rule has been violated. Social rule violations such as that are perhaps the unique 
case of normativity that can be partly captured by an EC-Wittgensteinian account such as 
Rietveld’s. Yet, importantly, social (linguistic) rule violation does not sufficiently, let alone 
foundationally account for the norm violation depicted above. The normativity of the involved 
action is compromised only if I care about the linguistic rule violation. Yet, for instance, I 
might actually like the outcome that results from the rule violation more than what would 
have resulted from proper linguistic rule-following. Or I might reject the Reuben Sandwich, 
not because of a social linguistic rule violation, but because I care for getting a Kale Sandwich 
because I care for things such as animal ethics or a particular taste. And the latter have 
nothing to do with social rule-following. Even though the waiter violated a social rule, the 
normative aspects of her action depend on my care for animal ethics and taste, not on the 
violation of a linguistic rule. The linguistic rule merely helps to coordinate actions so that they are in 
accord with the agential norms for which we care—they do not constitute this normativity by themselves. 
To further stress this point here, if I would live in a society that does not care about animals, 
would I then even act not normatively, if I reject the BLT sandwich because of animal ethical 
reasons, because the guiding social rule would be to consume animals. I think we have reached 
a good point to focus now on the ethically problematic aspects of the idea that social rule-
following constitutes the normativity of action.
As the discussion of the sandwich example already indicates, social practices and rules often 
stand in antagonistic relationships to the normativity that derives from care for oneself and 
others. Yet, authors working in the EC-Wittgensteinian tradition assume a Panglossian world 
where learning a skill according to social norms contributes to the ﬂourishing of oneself and 
others, and where the actions that are performed in accord with social norms are intrinsically 
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good; both ethically and epistemically.4 Basically, a preestablished harmony between the 
things one cares for and social rules seems to exist according to their view. Recall Rietveld’s 
(2008b) statement above: “Due to all this largely unobtrusive and unnoticed disciplining of the 
body the architect has learned to see what is right and what is not. She develops preferences and 
sensitivities along the lines of the examples set by these experts” (p. 989). I argue that this is the case 
for only very few activities and only very few people. For most people, it seems that one of the 
two following situations applies. 
First, to speak with Marx and Engels (1845-1846/1958), either stand under the inﬂuence 
of false consciousness and follow social practices as if they were in accord with your 
own care; either out of a lack of critical understanding or out of emotional dissonance. 
Second, constantly compromise in an inner affective struggle between the demands of an 
authoritarian, law-like world and your own normativity deriving from care for yourself and 
others. 
In general, it seems that the EC-Wittgensteinian idea of normativity as harmonious social-
rule-following derives from the lack of a proper phenomenology of everyday activities that 
is representative of the social, economic and ethical reality of most people. For most people 
actions are centered on things for which they care: food, shelter, dignity, appreciation, 
freedom, and pleasure in one’s recreational time. And these things have to be negotiated, 
compromised and brought in compliance with the economic and social reality that they face. 
A reality where most of us must spend an overwhelming part of our waking lives by selling our labor 
for employers and their economic aims within a system that seems to care little about human 
ﬂourishing and what we as individuals care for. That the everydayness of the overwhelming 
part of people is comprised by work (or rather labor) which happens under subpar social and 
economic standards is unfortunately even missing from Heidegger’s work that often focuses 
on artifacts such as a singular, isolated episode of hammering a nail or romanticized and 
isolated instances of classic craftsmanship. 
Now, Rietveld believes that the conceptual framework that he uses to describe the everyday 
actions of certain experts extends to other cases of everyday actions—as one should expect.
For example, can we apply the conceptual framework of being moved to improve to 
the preparation of soup by a professional cook as well as by the person who is skillfully 
preparing dinner at home? To me it seems that all of the above suggests that we can, 
but it will still require some work to articulate the conditions under which we can do 
so. (Rietveld, 2008b, p. 996)
Yet, we directly see the problems with Rietveld’s account, if we switch our focus to a 
“mundane” working life like that of a poor subway toilet cleaner. If we replace the prestigious, 
perhaps economically unconstrained architect with an underpaid toilet cleaner, it seems 
cynical to assume that she feels “compelled”, “disciplined”, or “moved to improve” to clean the 
restrooms of the subway station according to the social expectation what a properly clean 
toilet has to look like. Neither seems it appropriate to call her “attuned to ways of acting”, i.e. 
cleaning a toilet, or “mastering the craft” of subway toilet cleaning—terms that Rietveld uses in 
the context of architectural actions (Rietveld, 2008b, p. 989).
Obviously, there is an expectation we share about how a clean toilet looks like. But we see in 
the toilet cleaner case what happens when we make a norm out of rules and expectations. The 
4 I use at times “ethical” or “epistemic” interchangeably with “normative”. I do this to highlight the particular aspect 
of a normative phenomenon in a context that might be either primarily ethical or primarily epistemic.
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toilet cleaner is only a good toilet cleaner—and here we clearly see the full normative force 
of the term “good”—when she acts according to the expectation. But why should she, in the 
normative sense of care that we have for her and that she has for herself, act according to that 
expectation under the social, economic and socio-psychological conditions under which she 
most likely will have to work, i.e. terrible ones? Obviously, under none, if we are not economic 
paternalists. 
And this shows us that there is a huge difference between acting according to an expectation based on 
a social rule and acting normatively. The prior expresses whether someone works according to a 
social rule, independent of whether this rule is evil, good, arbitrary or absurd, while the latter 
bestows an ethical status on someone’s actions. And we should be very cautious to bestow this 
ethical status on people primarily based on their involvement in a network of social rules that 
are not of their own making—that have become their “form of life”, but not based on their 
choice.
In Rietveld’s defense, he claims that, “one of the important conditions is probably that the 
person cares enough about the consequences of his actions or the quality of his performance 
(in the case of experts such emotional engagement is typically high)”, in order to apply his 
EC-Wittgensteinian conceptual framework (Rietveld, 2008b, p. 996). Yet, this claim is dubious, 
because why should a proper account of normative action be based on the motivation of 
the agent? A sufficient account of normative action should generalize to all kinds of actions. 
But even if Rietveld’s framework would be applied only to cases in which high emotional 
engagement were present, the framework still entails unintuitive consequences. Take 
for instance the philosophical socialization of Descartes. He learned his “craft” from the 
scholastics but did not get attuned to how those experts in the field did philosophy. Did 
Descartes therefore act not-normatively, despite being highly emotionally engaged? Certainly 
not; rather, we might say, he was the one who acted normatively because his care for 
philosophy and truth made him break with the craft of the scholastics and their rules. How 
does this fit Rietveld’s (2008b) following claim: “In the long run, the community’s established ways 
of acting become ingrained and our architect will finally display appropriate action instinctively, in 
Wittgenstein’s sense” (p. 989, italics mine). Obviously not at all.
To sum up, the normativity of action does often not derive from social rule-following. Rather 
to the contrary, there is a constant, often private inner struggle between social rule-following 
and what we normatively care for. To assume that the normativity of action derives from 
social rule-following, therefore, appears shockingly authoritarian at worst; playing in the 
hands of those who have economic, epistemic, social and political power, or hopelessly 
naïve at best, derived from the living world of worldly-detached philosophers. When some 
philosophers talk about the social dimension of the normativity of action, they apparently 
think about a casual game of chess or romanticize about a pre-industrial craftsman working in 
her cabin, but do not think about the complex and often brutal fabric of social, economic and 
political factors that make up the domain of sociality for most humans. Consider for instance 
the examples that Dreyfus (2002, 2007) regularly discusses when he analyzes skillful action. 
Most often he talks about professional chess players or other people involved in games and 
the arts. Or consider Montero (2013), who primarily discusses professional athletes and artistic 
dancers, whereas Rietveld often takes examples from non-ordinary, artistic architecture 
(Rietveld, 2008b; Rietveld and Brouwers, 2017). These authors focus on elite activities with a 
high potential for social distinction (Bourdieu, 1979/1984). And those cases that they discuss 
always seem to assume that the involved agent has an uncritical stance towards the rules and 
skills that she has to adapt and that these social rules are good in a normative sense. 
The term “normative” originally referred in philosophy to phenomena that are ethically or 
epistemically desirable. That is, the term has been used in philosophy in stark contrast to 
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contingent rule-following that is potentially aethical and aepistemic. A conceptual distinction 
between “normative” and “rule-following” is desirable to clarify the difference between, 
for instance, ethical and aethical rule-following. Yet, unfortunately, “normative” has come 
to be applied to domains such as language use, logical correctness, skill at any activity, 
any standard of correctness and rule-following. Obviously, ordinary language allows to 
use normative concepts such as “good” or “bad”, “right” or “wrong” with regard to these 
rule-following practices. Yet, if we do so in the context of philosophy without qualification 
and differentiation, we end up rendering simple rule-following practices with an ethical 
and epistemic significance that they do not possess. Rietveld, Kiverstein and other EC-
Wittgensteinians blur the meaning of “normative” in this sense, in that they use “normative” 
with a double meaning that pertains to rule-following simpliciter, yet that also expresses that 
this rule-following is ethically or epistemically desirable.
But, rather than merely rule-following, people often are motivated to act normatively in the 
ethical and epistemic sense; they act according to what seems right to them in accordance 
with their care structure—not necessarily deliberatively, but tacitly. Or they at least often 
compromise between what seems right to them and what is demanded from them by social 
rule-following. And again, if we blur this distinction, as for instance Rietveld does, we receive 
a picture of humans as not only constantly following social rules, independent of whether 
they are good or bad for them or others, but also as finding them desirable on top of that. 
The latter might be unfortunately contingently true in many societies where people suffer 
from dissonance or false consciousness. Yet, philosophers must not tacitly incorporate things 
like dissonance or false consciousness into their normative accounts of action without the 
qualification that dissonance and false consciousness are undesirable epistemic and ethical 
fallacies that are contingent on a particular form of society. Therefore, it is at least important 
for philosophers who are concerned with providing ontological accounts of the normativity 
of action to not blur the distinction between normativity and simple, linguistically mediated 
social rule-following. 
I have argued that, despite all its virtues, Rietveld’s and Kiverstein’s account of everyday 
human action locates the source of the normativity of action incorrectly. Instead of 
linguistically mediated social practices, care for oneself and others, that has an ethical 
component to it, should be considered as the source of the normativity of everyday human 
actions. Further, I have highlighted the Panglossian, authoritarian undertones of the social 
rule-following paradigm that is commonly used in embodied cognition. These authoritarian 
tendencies might emerge from a misguided focus on certain idealized and unrepresentative 
cases of everyday human actions. If we, however, switch the focus to representative everyday 
actions, we see that social rule-following is often constraining humans in unethical and 
unepistemic ways, that render the claim that the normativity of everyday actions should 
derive from social practices highly dubious.
Fortunately, it should be easy for proponents of embodied cognition to switch the focus of 
their research to care. Many of them consider themselves phenomenologists and there is 
plenty of phenomenological literature that shows the foundational role of care for action and 
normativity (Heidegger, 1927/2006; Jeuk, 2017a, 2019; Ratcliffe, 2002). Further, there is plenty 
of phenomenological as well as embodied cognition literature on sensorimotor systems and 
embodied mechanisms that allows for the explanation of the non-deliberative monitoring of 
skillful action against the backdrop of care-based normativity (Dreyfus, 2007; Freeman, 2000; 
Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Heidegger, 1929/2010; Husserl, 1952, 1918–1926/1966; Jeuk, 2017a,b, 
2019; Ratcliffe, 2015).
What will be more challenging for proponents of embodied cognition will be to develop 
4. Conclusion
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representative cases of everyday human actions. It was one of the main aims of embodied 
cognition to put the environment of agents in the focus of explanations of cognition and 
action. Yet, unfortunately, proponents of embodied cognition have focused on really narrow 
cases of animal-environment interactions, such as hammering a nail or using one’s direct 
material environment to direct one’s actions. Or they have focused on too general cases, 
such as language use simpliciter as that what is supposedly explaining the totality of human 
social interactions. The former case is way too isolated; the latter case overemphasizes the 
role of language and rules immensely. Rather, what is needed is an account of the human 
environment that comprises the social, cultural, ethical, political and economic forces that 
constantly have a direct or indirect background inﬂuence on human action. Differently put, 
proponents of embodied cognition and many phenomenologists too will have to leave the 
unrepresentative cases of action that function as the descriptive basis of their work behind 
and develop more accurate representative descriptions.
Only if such an account is in place, will we be able to receive an adequate account of the 
relationship between the normativity of action based on care for oneself and others and the 
set of social, cultural, ethical, political and economic institutions that force us to compromise 
our normative stance while acting in the world.
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